Grammar and Aesthetic Mechanismus. From Wittgenstein&#8217;s Tractatus to the Lectures on Aesthetics by Desideri, Fabrizio
	   rivista	  on-­‐line	  del	  Seminario	  Permanente	  di	  Estetica	   	  
anno	  VI,	  numero	  1	  
pag.	  17	  
©	  Firenze	  University	  Press	  •	  Aisthesis	  •	  1/2013	  •	  www.fupress.com/aisthesis	  •	  ISSN	  2035-­‐8466	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  and	  Aesthetic	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From	  Wittgenstein’s	  Tractatus	  to	  the	  Lectures	  on	  Aesthetics	  	  
Fabrizio	  Desideri	  
Traditionally	  –	  and	  at	  least	  until	  very	  recently1	  –	  aesthetics	  has	  not	  been	  a	  main	  access	  
route	   to	   the	  understanding	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	   philosophy,	   of	   the	   challenges	   and	   issues	  
that	  Wittgenstein’s	  work	  brings	  up,	  from	  the	  Tractatus	  on.	  It	  is	  not	  on	  the	  playground	  of	  
aesthetics	  that	  the	  game	  of	   interpretation	  of	  typically	  Wittgensteinian	   issues	  –	  such	  as	  
the	   significance	   of	   philosophy,	   the	   limits	   of	   language,	   the	   nature	   of	   meaning,	   the	  
relationship	  between	  grammar	  and	   forms	  of	   life	  –	  has	  been	  played.	  At	  best,	   aesthetic	  
problems	   have	   been	   considered	   a	   significant,	   but	   secondary	   aspect	   of	   the	   core	   of	  
Wittgenstein’s	   philosophy,	   defined,	   first	   and	   foremost,	   by	   the	   issue	   concerning	   the	  
relationship	   between	   logic	   and	   language,	   and	   the	   resulting	   confrontation	   with	   his	  
mentors,	   Frege	   and	   Russell.	   An	   aspect	   of	  Wittgenstein’s	   views,	   possibly	   related	   to	   his	  
Viennese	  education	  within	  his	   “very	  musical”	   family	   and/or	   linked	  with	  his	  pessimistic	  
critique	  of	  European	  Civilization.	  An	  aspect,	  however,	  incapable	  of	  influencing	  Wittgen-­‐
stein’s	   formulation	   of	   philosophical	   problems	   and	   strategy	   for	   addressing	   them.	  
Aesthetics,	   then,	  has	  mostly	  been	   seen	  as	  one	  of	   the	  many	  areas	  where	  philosophical	  
work	  was	   required,	  where	  philosophy,	  understood	  as	  a	   form	  of	   therapy,	  could	  help	   to	  
release	   one	   from	   metaphysical	   enchantments	   and	   linguistic	   misunderstandings.	   This,	  
	  
1	  To	  prove	  that	  the	  question	  of	  aesthetics	  (at	   least	  until	  the	  last	  decade	  of	  the	  last	  century)	  has	  
been	   considered	   marginal	   to	   the	   understanding	   of	   Wittgenstein’s	   philosophy	   (with	   a	   few	  
honorable	  exceptions),	   it	  can	  be	  pointed	  out,	  for	  instance,	  that	  in	  the	  Cambridge	  Companion	  to	  
Wittgenstein,	   edited	   by	   H.	   Sluga	   and	   D.	   G.	   Stern,	   not	   only	   there	   is	   no	   specific	   discussion	   of	  
Wittgenstein	   and	   aesthetics,	   but	   also	   the	   very	   term	   “aesthetics”	   appears	   seldom	   and	   not	   in	  
relevant	  contexts.	  The	  situation	  has	  changed	  with	  The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  Wittgenstein,	  edited	  
by	  O.	  Kuusela	  and	  M.	  McGinn,	  where	  an	  excellent	  essay	  by	  Malcolm	  Budd	  (2011)	   is	  devoted	  to	  
Wittgenstein	  and	  aesthetics	  and	  Wittgenstein’s	   interest	   in	  music	  and	  the	  arts	  are	  considered	   in	  
other	  essays	  as	  well.	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however,	   prevented	   interpreters	   from	   considering	   whether	   and	   in	   how	   far	   Wittgen-­‐
stein’s	  philosophy	  (from	  the	  Tractatus	   to	   the	   Investigations	   to	  his	  Last	  Writings	  on	  the	  
Philosophy	   of	   Psychology)	   could	   contribute	   to	   a	   radical	   redefinition	   of	   the	   conceptual	  
field	   of	   aesthetics,	   in	   relation	   both	   to	   ethics	   and	   to	   language.	   Even	   recent	   and	   very	  
influential	   interpretations	   of	   Wittgenstein’s	   thought	   have	   mostly	   focused	   on	   ethics	  
rather	  than	  on	  aesthetics.	  The	  so-­‐called	  «new	  Wittgenstein»	  of	  «resolute»	  interpreters	  
is,	   in	   fact,	   primarily	   an	   ethical	   philosopher,	   while	   the	   Wittgenstein	   of	   the	   standard	  
interpretation	  might	   look	   like	   an	   ascetically	   “analytical”	   philosopher.	   It	   would	   be	   too	  
easy	  to	  contrast	  these	  synthetic	  images	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  
and	   an	   “aesthetic”	   Wittgenstein,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   perhaps	   moving	   from	   what	  
Wittgenstein	  himself,	  in	  a	  famous	  remark	  reported	  by	  Drury,	  said	  of	  music,	  in	  relation	  to	  
the	  Philosophical	  Investigations:	  «It	   is	   impossible	  to	  say	  in	  my	  book	  one	  word	  about	  all	  
that	  music	  has	  meant	  in	  my	  life.	  How	  then	  can	  I	  hope	  to	  be	  understood?»	  (M.O'C.	  Drury	  
[1984]:	  94).	  
One	  might	  say	  that	  music	  is	  not	  aesthetics,	  but	  it	  cannot	  be	  denied	  that	  it	  necessarily	  
refers	   to	  aesthetics,	  beginning	  with	   its	  non-­‐verbal-­‐language	  character,	  whose	  meaning	  
can	   shed	   light	   on	   the	  meaning	   of	   the	   proposition.	   The	   theme	  of	   the	   affinity	   between	  
understanding	   a	   proposition	   and	   understanding	   a	   musical	   theme,	   then	   –	   an	   affinity	  
analyzed	   in	   an	   important	   and	   widely	   quoted	   remark	   appearing	   (with	   significant	  
variations)	  in	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  Nachlass	  (from	  the	  Bemerkungen	  zur	  Philosophischen	  
Grammatik	  to	  the	  Philosophische	  Bemerkungen	  and	  the	  Big	  Typescript)	  and	  included	  in	  §	  
527	  of	   the	   Investigations	   –	  may	  well	  be	  a	  good	   starting	  point	   for	  a	   clarification	  of	   the	  
relationship	  between	  Wittgenstein’s	   thought	  and	  aesthetics.	  The	  sense	  unit	   immanent	  
to	   both	   musical	   theme	   and	   proposition,	   a	   topic	   Wittgenstein	   insists	   on	   since	   his	  
Tagebücher	   1914-­‐16	   and	  Prototractatus,	   allows,	   in	   fact,	   for	   grasping	   on	   the	   one	   hand	  
the	  meaning	  of	  the	  proposition	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  «Satzklang»	  (propositional	  sound)	  and,	  
on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  internal	  articulations	  of	  the	  musical	  theme,	  as	  if	  they	  were	  parts	  
of	  a	  sentence.	  To	  this	  path,	  covered	  with	  great	  skill	  by	  Aldo	  Giorgio	  Gargani	  in	  his	  latest	  
book	  (Gargani	   [2008]),	   I	  have	  already	  devoted	  a	  short	  essay	  (Desideri	   [2008]:	  133-­‐147)	  
and	   a	   number	   of	   observations	   in	   the	   chapter	   on	   the	   aesthetic	   character	   of	   under-­‐
standing	   that	   appears	   in	   my	   recent	   La	   percezione	   riflessa	   (Desideri	   [2011]).	   Here,	  
however,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  go	  a	  different	  route,	  although	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  to	  underestimate	  
the	   importance	   and	   validity	   of	   that	   approach,	   which	   allows	   for	   bringing	   out	   strong	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elements	   of	   continuity	   in	  Wittgenstein’s	   thought2,	   at	   least	   as	   far	   as	   the	   theme	   of	   the	  
unity	  of	  propositional	   sense	   is	   concerned.	   I	   shall	   focus	  on	   the	  analysis	  of	   the	   fractures	  
and	  tensions	  characterizing	  not	  only	  the	  relationship	  between	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  
and	   aesthetics,	   but	   also	   the	   very	   style	   of	   Wittgenstein’s	   thought.	   The	   relationship	  
between	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  and	  aesthetics	  and	  its	   internal	   link	  with	  his	  style	  of	  
thought3	  shall	   be	   considered	   from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   the	   conceptual	   tension	   that	  
generates	   both	   of	   them.	   Following	   this	   path,	   I	   believe,	   it	   should	   be	   easier	   to	   avoid	  
shortcuts	   and	   over-­‐synthesization,	   which	   could	   give	   us	   obliging	   images	   of	   a	  
“hermeneutic”	   or	   even	   “deconstructionist”	   Wittgenstein,	   where	   the	   unmistakable	  
timbre	   of	   his	   philosophy	   would	   be	   lost.	   Instead	   of	   contrasting	   images	   (that	   of	  
Wittgenstein	   as	   an	   “aesthetic”	   philosopher	   and	   that	   of	   the	   “ethical”	  Wittgenstein),	   it	  
seems	  to	  me	  that	  the	  most	  fruitful	  strategy	  consists	  in	  addressing	  a	  specific	  issue	  from	  a	  
conceptual	   and	   textual	   standpoint,	   an	   issue	   such	   that	   it	   should	   allow	   us	   not	   only	   to	  
understand	   whether	   and	   how	   determinant	   and	   central	   the	   aesthetic	   problem	   is	   for	  
Wittgenstein,	  but	  also	  to	  see	  how	  aesthetics	  itself	  can	  be	  radically	  reshaped	  through	  the	  
thin	  disquieting	  filter	  offered	  by	  Wittgenstein’s	  thought.	  
The	  specific	  question	   I	   intend	   to	  build	  on	  concerns	   the	   relationship	  between	  ethics	  
and	  aesthetics	  in	  the	  Tractatus	  and	  afterwards.	  I	  claim	  that	  only	  by	  means	  of	  an	  inquiry	  
into	   the	   unity	   of	   ethics	   and	   aesthetics	   we	   can	   consistently	   and	   fruitfully	   bring	   out	  
Wittgenstein’s	   expressivism,	   an	   aspect	   of	   his	   thought	   much	   and	   rightly	   stressed	   by	  
Gargani	   in	   his	   last	  works.	   To	   this	   end,	   I	   believe,	   however,	   that	  we	   should	  move	   away	  
from	  the	  main	  argument	  put	  forward	  by	  Cora	  Diamond4,	  where,	  it	  seems	  to	  me,	  idea	  of	  
philosophy	  as	  a	  therapeutic	  activity	  basically	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  work	  of	  self-­‐unfolding	  
between	  the	  related	  spheres	  of	  imagination	  and	  ethical	  life.	  What	  is	  striking	  in	  the	  «new	  
Wittgenstein»	  philosophers’	  insistence	  on	  the	  link	  between	  imagination	  and	  ethical	  life	  
is	  that	  they	  seem	  completely	  oblivious	  to	  the	  need	  to	  distinguish	  ethics	  from	  aesthetics	  	  
2	  A	  continuity	  that	  goes	  back,	  as	  I	  have	  already	  mentioned,	  to	  the	  so-­‐called	  Prototractatus	  and	  in	  
particular	   to	   the	   observation	   3.16021,	   where	   Wittgenstein	   says	   succinctly	   that	   	   «A	   theme	   in	  
music	  is	  a	  proposition»	  (L.	  Wittgenstein,	  [1971]:	  63).	  
3	  Two	   aspects	   converging,	   meaningfully,	   in	   the	   intimately	   musical	   character	   of	   Wittgenstein’s	  
thought,	  in	  its	  unfolding	  and	  articulation,	  where	  the	  sense	  of	  rhythm	  and	  the	  art	  of	  variation	  are	  
decisive	   for	   its	   aphoristic	   ramifications	   and	   for	   the	   fragmentary,	   sketch-­‐like	   character	   of	   the	  
observations.	  
4	  See,	   for	   instance,	  Diamond	   (2000):	  49-­‐173.	  There	   is	  now	  a	  consistent	  amount	  of	   literature	  on	  
this	  topic.	  I	  shall	  limit	  myself	  to	  referring	  to	  many	  of	  the	  remarks	  contained	  in	  several	  essays	  by	  
Hacker,	  especially	   (2000):	  353-­‐388	  and	  (2003):	  1-­‐23,	  which	  address	  several	  objections	  to	   James	  
Conant’s	  reading	  of	  Wittgenstein.	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conceptually,	   assuming	   sic	   et	   simpliciter	   their	   unity,	   and	   assimilating	   or	   annexing	   the	  
latter	  to	  the	  former.	  The	  aesthetic,	  so	  conceived,	  amounts	  then	  to	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  
variant	   of	   the	   ethical,	   distinguished	   from	   it	   mostly	   because	   of	   its	   specific	   objects	   of	  
concern	   (literature,	   cinema,	  music).	  The	  key	  concept	  of	   the	   therapeutic	  conception	  of	  
philosophical	  work	   is	   that	  of	  ethics,	  an	  ethics	  that	   requires	   to	  be	  radically	   reconceived	  
through	   a	   first-­‐hand	   imaginative	   commitment.	   Here	   it	  might	   be	   pointed	   out	   that	   it	   is	  
Wittgenstein	  himself	  who	   legitimizes	   this	  assumption,	   since	  he	  writes	  explicitly	  on	   the	  
unity	  of	  ethics	  and	  aesthetics,	  and	  he	  does	  this	  in	  the	  clearest	  and	  most	  peremptory	  way	  
in	   the	   claim	   in	   brackets	   that	   appears	   in	   the	   final	   part	   of	   the	   Tractatus,	   «(Ethics	   and	  
aesthetics	  are	  one.)»	  (Wittgenstein	  [1922]	  =	  TLP,	  §	  6.421),	  but	  also	  earlier,	  in	  a	  number	  
of	   observations	   from	   the	   Tagebücher	   1914-­‐1916,	   and	   later	   in	   the	   Lecture	   on	   Ethics	  
(1929).	   It	   is	   easy	   to	   see	   how	   much	   the	   atmosphere	   of	   Wittgenstein’s	   discourse	   has	  
changed	  in	  the	  1938	  Lectures	  on	  Aesthetics.	  It	  is	  less	  obvious,	  and	  perhaps	  more	  fruitful,	  
to	  ask	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  unity	  between	  ethics	  and	  aesthetics	  established	  in	  
the	   Tractatus	   was	   sustainable	   in	   the	   very	   context	   of	   the	   Tractatus,	   and	   to	   consider	  
whether	   it	  was	  rather	  already	  being	  undermined	  from	  within	  by	  conceptual	  and	  meta-­‐
conceptual	  tensions.	  
In	   the	   first	  place,	   then,	  we	  need	  to	  clarify	  what	   the	  Tractatus	   claim	  that	  ethics	  and	  
aesthetics	   «sind	   eins»	   might	   entail.	   Secondly,	   we	   need	   to	   check	   if	   and	   how	   the	  
conceptual	   consistency	   of	   the	   «being	   one»	   of	   ethics	   and	   aesthetics	   is	   transformed	  
during	   the	  1930s,	   to	   the	  point	   that	   it	   requires	  a	  different	  configuration:	   the	  metamor-­‐
phosis	  of	  the	  logical	  unity	  between	  the	  two	  conceptual	  fields	  into	  an	  analogical	  affinity	  
(into	   a	   family	   resemblance	   between	   the	   aesthetic	   and	   the	   ethical).	   By	   means	   of	   this	  
double	   check	   we	   should	   be	   able	   to	   consider	   not	   only	   the	   non-­‐secondary	   role	   of	   the	  
aesthetic	   in	   Wittgenstein’s	   thought,	   but	   also	   Wittgenstein’s	   crucial	   contribution	   to	   a	  
radical	  reconception	  of	  aesthetics	  itself.	  	  
First	  things	  first.	  As	  for	  the	  unity	  of	  ethics	  and	  aesthetics	  established	  in	  TLP,	  §6.421,	  
how	   can	  we	   think	   of	   it	  while	   remaining	  within	   a	   Tractarian	   perspective,	   if	  we	   are	   not	  
happy	  with	  the	  mere	  postulation	  of	  this	  idea?	  It	  does	  not	  seem	  feasible	  neither	  to	  go	  the	  
apophatic	   way,	   giving	   an	   ontologically	   negative	   definition	   (ethics	   and	   aesthetics	   are	  
«one»	   in	   that	   they	   are	   both	   ineffable)	   nor	   to	   go	   the	   nominalist	   way,	   giving	   a	   purely	  
conventional	  definition	  (ethics	  and	  aesthetics	  are	  two	  labels	  for	  the	  same	  substance	  or	  
reality).	  In	  both	  cases	  (the	  ineffability	  and	  the	  conventionalist	  solution),	  the	  unity	  would	  
result	  in	  a	  pure	  and	  simple	  identity:	  ethics	  and	  aesthetics	  would	  not	  be	  just	  «one»,	  but	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also	  the	  very	  same	  thing)5.	  An	  elegant	  solution	  might	  consist	  in	  claiming	  that	  ethics	  and	  
aesthetics	   are	   two	   from	   a	   semantic-­‐conceptual	   point	   of	   view,	   and	  one	   from	   an	   onto-­‐
logical	   point	  of	   view:	   they	  differ	   as	   to	   their	  Sinn,	   but	   converge	   in	   reference	  or	  Bedeu-­‐
tung,	  to	  say	  it	  with	  Frege.	  Although	  it	   is	  understandable	  that	  one	  might	  be	  tempted	  to	  
solve	   the	  problem	   in	   this	  way,	  not	  even	  a	  Fregean	  solution	   is	   satisfactory.	  This	   can	  be	  
grasped	   first	   and	   foremost	   if	   we	   consider	   the	   relationship	   that	   ethics	   and	   aesthetics	  
have	  with	  the	  world	  understood	  as	  the	  totality	  of	  the	  facts.	  
Let	   us	   see,	   then,	   what	   the	   difference	   between	   ethics	   and	   aesthetics	   might	   entail.	  
They	  definitely	  have	  a	  similar	  effect	  on	  our	  image	  of	  the	  world.	  Both	  have	  the	  power	  of	  
changing	   the	   inner	   boundary	   of	   the	  world	   (they	   give	  meaning	   to	   the	  world),	   without	  
adding	   or	   taking	   away	   anything	   from	   a	   factual	   point	   of	   view.	   Their	   transcendental	  
character	  (if	  ethics	   is	  transcendental,	   then	  aesthetics	  necessarily	   is	  as	  well)	   takes	  them	  
both	  away	   from	   the	  domain	  of	   facts	   and,	   therefore,	   from	   the	  horizon	  of	  what	   can	  be	  
sensibly	  expressed.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  is	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  character	  of	  super-­‐forms	  
of	   life	   (of	  domains	  of	   intentional	   activation)	   that	   the	  world	  as	   the	   totality	  of	   the	   facts	  
acquires	   meaning.	   It	   acquires	   meaning	   precisely	   because	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   is	   seen/	  
considered	  (evaluated?)	  differently,	  namely	  sub	  species	  aeterni,	  in	  relation	  to	  will,	  from	  
the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  ethics,	  and	  in	  relation	  to	  intuition	  (the	  eye),	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  
of	   aesthetics.	   Neither	   will,	   nor	   insight,	   however,	   are	   here	   to	   be	   considered	   phe-­‐
nomenally	   or	   psychologically.	   By	   virtue	   of	   their	   being	   transcendental,	   ethics	   and	  
aesthetics	  appear	  as	  «one»	   in	  that	  they	  both	  constitute	  the	  condition	  of	  possibility	   for	  
the	  attribution	  of	  meaning	  to	  the	  world.	  Their	  unity,	  their	  being	  twins6,	  is	  made	  evident	  	  
5	  The	  English	   translation	  by	  David	  Pears	  and	  Brian	  McGuinness	   (Wittgenstein	   [1961])	  generates	  
some	  ambiguity,	  because	  6.421	  is	  translated	  with	  «Ethics	  and	  aesthetics	  are	  one	  and	  the	  same»:	  
«one	   and	   the	   same»	   says	  more,	   logically,	   than	  what	   the	  German	  «sind	   Eins»	   says.	   Therefore	   I	  
have	  preferred	  to	  follow	  C.	  K.	  Ogden’s	  translation,	  which	  in	  this	  passage	  is	  closer	  to	  the	  German:	  
«Ethics	   and	   aesthetics	   are	   one».	   It	   is	   also	   relevant	   that	   Wittgenstein	   writes	   «sind	   in	   einem	  
Gewissen	  Sinne	  Eins»	  while	  referring	  to	   language	  and	  the	  world	   in	  TLP,	  4.014.	  Both	  Ogden	  and	  
Pears	  and	  McGuinness	  correctly	  render	  this	  passage	  with	  «are	  in	  a	  certain	  sense	  one».	  Here,	  the	  
fairy-­‐tale	  reference	  is	  enlightening	  (see	  the	  next	  footnote).	  
6	  «The	  gramophone	  record,	  the	  musical	  thought,	  the	  score,	  the	  waves	  of	  sound,	  all	  stand	  to	  one	  
another	  in	  that	  pictorial	  internal	  relation,	  which	  holds	  between	  language	  and	  the	  world.	  To	  all	  of	  
them	  the	  logical	  structure	  is	  common.	  (Like	  the	  two	  youths,	  their	  two	  horses	  and	  their	  lilies	  in	  the	  
story.	  They	  are	  all	   in	  a	  certain	  sense	  one.)»	  (TLP,	  4.014).	  Here	  Wittgenstein	  is	  writing	  about	  the	  
internal	   relation	   (which	   here	   is	   still	   only	   representational)	   between	   language	   and	  world,	  while	  
referring	   to	   the	  Grimm	  brothers’	   tale	  Die	  Goldkinder.	   The	   two	   young	  men,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   two	  
horses	  and	  two	  golden	   lilies,	  arise	  from	  a	  miraculous	  fish,	  divided	   into	  six	  parts:	  they	  all	  have	  a	  
common	   origin	   and	   their	   lives	   are	   linked	   by	   a	   single	   thread,	   although	   each	   of	   them,	   through	  
various	   adventures,	   encounters	   a	  different	   fate.	   The	   fact	   that	  Wittgenstein,	   in	   TLP	  4.014,	   does	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by	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  both	  constitute	  this	  condition	  of	  meaning.	  The	  being-­‐one	  of	  ethics	  
and	  aesthetics,	   then,	  can	  be	  formulated	  only	   in	  the	   logical	  space	  of	  possibilities.	  Ethics	  
and	  aesthetics	  are,	  and	  they	  cannot	  but	  be,	  inside	  this	  space,	  otherwise	  they	  would	  be	  
condemned	   to	  meaninglessness.	  On	   the	  other	   hand,	  within	   this	   space	   they	   cannot	  be	  
but	   external,	   they	   cannot	   but	   stand	   at	   the	   borders	   of	   the	   world	   understood	   as	   the	  
totality	   of	   the	   facts	   and	   at	   the	  borders	   of	   all	   possible	   propositions,	  which	   contain	   the	  
image	  of	  the	  world.	  They	  are	  external	  to	  the	  world,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  are	  capable	  of	  
widening	   its	  borders,	  of	  changing	   it:	   they	  can	  change	   it	  without	   there	  being	  any	  single	  
change	  within	   it	   (see	  TLP,	  6.43).	  What	  changes	   is	   the	   image	  of	   the	  world:	  Die	  Welt	  als	  
Wille	   und	   Anschauung:	   schopenhauerisch	   –	   as	   Wittgenstein	   himself	   hinted	   in	   the	  
Tagebücher	   (L.	  Wittgenstein	   [1979]:	   79	   =	   NB,	   2.8.1916).	   By	   virtue	   of	   this	   paradoxical	  
externality	   (the	  fact	  that	  they	  both	  consist	   in	  a	  form	  of	  will	  and	  a	  gaze	  standing	  at	  the	  
borders	  of	  both	  the	  world	  and	  language,	  and	  are	  therefore	  capable	  of	  grasping	  both	  as	  
limited	  wholes),	  ethics	  and	  aesthetics	  cannot	  find	  expression	  in	  the	  world;	  better:	  they	  
cannot	   find	  any	   form	  of	  expression	  whatsoever.	  Hence	   the	  silence	  on	  both	  of	   them,	  a	  
necessary	  and	  transcendental	  silence,	  perfectly	  logical	  (neither	  merely	  psychological	  nor	  
purely	   linguistic),	   logical	   form	  of	   the	  unexpressed,	  of	  what	  cannot	  be	  expressed	   	   ̶	   	   the	  
Ausdruckslose,	   to	   use	   the	   term	   coined	   by	   Benjamin	   in	   his	   essay	   on	   Goethe’s	   Elective	  
Affinities	   in	   order	   to	   indicate	   the	   internal	   condition	   of	   the	   expressiveness	   of	   the	  
artwork7.	  	  
not	  say	  explicitly	  what	  is	  the	  fairy-­‐tale	  he	  has	  in	  mind,	  has	  probably	  left	  unanswered	  the	  question	  
as	  of	   the	   interpretation	  of	   this	   reference.	   In	  Die	  Goldkinder,	   the	  golden	   fish	   fished	  by	   the	  poor	  
man	  performs	  miracles	   twice,	   so	   that	   its	   life	   is	   spared	   in	   return:	   on	   two	  occasions	   it	   turns	   the	  
poor	  fisherman’s	  hut	  into	  a	  splendid	  castle	  and	  fills	  the	  pantry	  making	  the	  poor	  man	  and	  his	  wife	  
happy.	  Both	  times,	  however,	  the	  couple	  loses	  everything	  because	  the	  poor	  man	  breaks	  the	  pact	  
of	  silence,	  revealing	  to	  his	  curious	  wife	  the	  origin	  of	  their	  sudden	  wealth.	  Only	  when	  the	  golden	  
fish	  is	  fished	  for	  the	  third	  time	  it	  gives	  up	  his	  freedom	  and	  his	  life,	  allowing	  to	  be	  brought	  home	  
and	  divided	  it	   into	  six	  parts	  by	  the	  poor	  man.	  From	  the	  six	  parts	  originate	  three	  pairs	  of	  golden	  
twins:	  two	  sons	  born	  to	  the	  fisherman’s	  wife,	  two	  foals	  born	  to	  their	  mare,	  and	  two	  lilies,	  sprung	  
from	  the	  soil.	  Linked	  by	  a	  common	  destiny,	   the	  two	  sons,	  once	  grown	  up,	  go	  through	  different	  
experiences	   and	   then	   join	   and	   separate	   again.	  Much	   could	   be	   said,	   if	   one	   would	   dare	   to	   put	  
forward	   an	   interpretation,	   about	   the	   meaning	   of	   the	   crypto-­‐quotation	   of	   this	   tale.	   All	   in	   all,	  
however,	   the	   tale	   already	   speaks	   for	   itself.	   It	   is	   about,	   among	   else,	   the	   necessity	   (or	   the	  
injunction)	   to	   remain	   silent	   and,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   about	   the	   incapability	   of	   observing	   this	  
command.	  
7	  In	   several	   of	   my	   works	   I	   have	   dwelt	   on	   the	   topic	   of	   the	   Ausdrucklose	   in	   Benjamin.	   See,	   for	  
instance,	  Desideri,	  (1995):	  54	  and	  Desideri,	  Baldi	  (2010):	  82	  and	  passim.	  We	  owe	  to	  Stanley	  Cavell	  
the	  stressing	  of	  the	  singular	  affinity	  between	  Benjamin	  and	  Wittgenstein	  (a	  topic	  on	  which	  I	  have	  
insisted	  since	  Desideri	  [1980]),	  beginning	  with	  their	  shared	  interest	  in	  the	  world	  of	  childhood	  and	  
their	  common	  admiration	  for	  Karl	  Kraus.	  As	  Cavell	  does	  not	  fail	  to	  point	  out,	  it	  is	  also	  on	  Goethe	  
Fabrizio	  Desideri,	  Grammar	  and	  Aesthetic	  Mechanismus	  
pag.	  23	  
©	  Firenze	  University	  Press	  •	  Aisthesis	  •	  1/2013	  •	  www.fupress.com/aisthesis	  •	  ISSN	  2035-­‐8466	  
Qua	   «transcendental»,	   the	   silence	   defining	   from	   the	   outside	   ethics	   and	   aesthetics	  
(life	   and	  world	   sub	   specie	   aeternitatis:	   life	   as	   seen	   from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	  will	   and	  
world	  as	  seen	  from	  that	  of	  intuition)	  cannot	  be	  «full	  of	  expression»8	  nor	  it	  can	  be,	  on	  the	  
opposite,	  a	  blank	  expression	  of	  pure	  nonsense.	  It	  can,	  at	  best,	  come	  up	  as	  the	  condition	  
of	   possibility	   of	   what	   can	   and	   cannot	   be	   expressed,	   as	   the	   condition	   of	   possibility	   of	  
meaning	   itself,	   then9.	  Qua	   condition	  of	   possibility,	   the	  Ausdruckslose	  holding	   together	  
ethics	  and	  aesthetics	  can	  only	  be	  felt.	  The	  meaning	  world	  and	  life	  acquire	  by	  means	  of	  
this	   logical	  silence	  is	  then	  related	  to	  feeling	  only,	  to	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  Gefühl:	   it	   is	  a	  
feeling	  of	  time	  without	  development,	  capturing	  the	  life-­‐world	  unity	  in	  the	  punctual	  form	  
of	  a	  nunc	   (which	   is	  what	  Benjamin	  calls	   the	  mystical	  nu	   in	  his	  Trauerspielbuch),	  a	  pure	  
present	   (and	   therefore	   life	  sub	  specie	  aeterni,	  because	  «he	   lives	  eternally	  who	   lives	   in	  
the	   present»	   TLP,	   §	   6.4311).	   In	   the	   hour	   of	   true	   feeling,	   a	   logical	   rather	   than	   psycho-­‐
logical	  feeling,	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  world	  appears,	  at	  the	  borders	  of	  language,	  ethically	  and	  
aesthetically.	  In	  such	  a	  punctual	  present	  the	  world	  grows	  and	  shrinks	  at	  the	  same	  time:	  
it	  lights	  up	  with	  meaning	  and	  becomes	  «other».	  Thus,	  «the	  world	  of	  the	  happy	  is	  quite	  
another	  than	  that	  of	  the	  unhappy»	  (TLP,	  §	  6.43).	  And	  this	  in	  the	  manner	  of	  a	  «mystical»	  
feeling	  destined	  to	  remain	  mute:	  expressionless.	  This	  is	  what	  we	  see,	  if	  we	  only	  look	  at	  
the	  logically	  specular	  link	  (Spiegelbild)	  between	  the	  totality	  of	  the	  sayable-­‐thinkable	  (the	  
totality	   of	   compossible	   elementary	   propositions)	   and	   the	   totality	   of	   the	   facts.	   The	  
expressionlessness	   (the	  muteness)	   ceases,	   however,	   if	   we	   look	   at	   the	   ethical	   and	   the	  
aesthetic	  (which	  in	  the	  Tagebücher	  Wittgenstein	  tends	  to	  translate	  with	  «art»)	  from	  the	  
point	  of	  view	  of	  their	  internal	  differentiation.	  This	  is	  where	  the	  general	  overlap	  between	  
the	   conceptual	   fields	   of	   ethics	   and	   aesthetics	   cracks,	   and	   it	   emerges	   that	   their	   being	  
«one»	  is	  not	  that	  of	  identity,	  but	  that	  of	  connection:	  «The	  work	  of	  art	  is	  the	  object	  seen	  
sub	  specie	  aeternitatis;	  and	  the	  good	  life	  is	  the	  world	  seen	  sub	  specie	  aeternitatis.	  This	  is	  
the	   connexion	   between	   art	   and	   ethics»	   (Wittgenstein	   [1979]:	   83	   =	   NB,	   7.10.16).	   The	  
good	  life	  is	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  beyond	  the	  separation	  between	  facts	  and	  value:	  it	  is	  «the	  life	  	  
and	  his	  morphological	  gaze	  that	  both	  philosophers	  have	  focused	  in	  their	  later	  writings	  (see	  Cavell	  
[1999]:	  235-­‐246).	  
8	  Here	  I	  distance	  myself	  from	  Gargani’s	  argument	  in	  Gargani	  (2008):	  136.	  
9	  This	   thesis	   is	   confirmed	   by	   a	   1931	   remark	   of	  Wittgenstein’s:	   «Perhaps	   what	   is	   inexpressible	  
(what	  I	  find	  mysterious	  and	  am	  not	  able	  to	  express)	  is	  the	  background	  against	  which	  whatever	  I	  
could	  express	  has	  its	  meaning»	  (Wittgenstein,	  [1980]:	  16e).	  [«Das	  Unaussprechbare	  (das,	  was	  mir	  
geheimnisvoll	   erscheint	  &	   ich	  nicht	  auszusprechen	  vermag)	  gibt	   vielleicht	  den	  Hintergrund,	  auf	  
dem	  das	   ich	  was	  aussprechen	  konnte	  Bedeutung	  bekommt»	   (Wittgenstein,	  Nachlass,	  Ms	  153a,	  
129v	  [3]).	  Here	  it	  is	  inevitable	  to	  stress	  the	  affinity	  between	  Wittgenstein’s	  Unaussprechbare	  and	  
Benjamin’s	  Ausdruckslose.	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of	  knowledge»,	  «the	  life	  that	  is	  happy	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  misery	  of	  the	  world»	  (Wittgenstein	  
[1979]:	  81	  =	  NB,	  13.8.16);	  similarly,	  the	  dimension	  of	  the	  will	  is	  not	  a	  sort	  of	  interiorized	  
intentionalism,	  «“To	   love	  one’s	  neighbour”	  would	  mean	  to	  will!»	  (Wittgenstein	  [1979]:	  
77	  =	  NB,	  29.7.16).	  Aesthetics	  or	  art,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  cannot	  be	  defined	  merely	  as	  a	  
«Künstlerische	  Betrachtungsweise»,	  i.e.	  they	  cannot	  be	  defined	  by	  an	  happy	  eye	  looking	  
at	   the	  miracle	  of	   the	  world,	   at	   the	  «That»,	   at	   the	   fact	   «das	   es	   gibt,	  was	   es	   gibt»	   (NB,	  
20.10.16)10.	  This	  not	  only	  because	  «the	  beautiful	  is	  what	  makes	  happy»	  and	  «the	  end	  of	  
art	   is	   the	  beautiful»	   (NB,	   21.10.16)11	  –	   and	   it	  would	  be	   contradictory	   to	  maintain	   that	  
beauty	  is	  only	  in	  the	  eye:	  the	  knowledge	  that	  applies	  to	  the	  ethical	  life	  cannot	  but	  apply	  
to	   the	  aesthetic	   life	  as	  well	  –,	  but	  also,	  and	  above	  all,	  because	   there	   is	  no	  art	  without	  
artworks:	   «Art	   is	   a	   kind	   of	   expression»	   and	   «Good	   art	   is	   complete	   expression»,	   der	  
vollendete	  Ausdruck	  (NB,	  19.9.16)12.	  
Here	   it	   looms	   the	   drama	   of	   the	   Tractatus:	   between	   sense	   brought	   back	   to	   feeling	  
(the	  mystical	  feeling	  that,	  in	  logical	  space,	  holds	  together	  ethical	  and	  aesthetic	  attitude)	  
and	  sense	  immanent	  to	  propositions	  telling	  the	  facts	  the	  world	  is	  made	  of	  (the	  totality	  of	  
elementary	  propositions	  as	  compossibility	  of	  all	  facts)	  there	  is	  no	  transition,	  no	  bridge.	  If	  
ethics	   and	   aesthetics	   ward	   off	   solipsism	   (beyond	   the	   limit	   of	   the	   self	   as	   unextended	  
point	  there	  is	  life	  in	  all	  its	  density),	  they	  do	  not	  save	  us	  from	  the	  dualism	  or	  parallelism	  
of	  expression.	  The	  dualism	  is	  that	  between	  the	  expressivism	  of	  propositions	  showing,	  by	  
means	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   say	   something,	   the	   essence	   of	   the	   world,	   and	   the	  
expressivism	  that,	  ethically	  and	  aesthetically,	  shows	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  world	  as	  something	  
over-­‐essential.	  As	  for	  the	  first	  (the	  realm	  of	  propositionally	  articulated	  language-­‐world),	  
expression	  takes	  place	  there	  in	  the	  relationship/passage	  between	  sign	  and	  symbol.	  The	  
sign	   becomes	   symbol	   by	   virtue	   of	   its	   being	   used	   (see	   TLP,	   §	   3.326):	   this	   concerns	   the	  
application	  of	   logical-­‐syntactic	  rules	  governing	  the	   life	  of	  the	  sign	  and	   logically	   forming	  
the	  symbolic	  unity	  of	   the	  proposition.	  But,	   in	  virtue	  of	   the	   logical	   form,	  which	  gives	  us	  
the	   essence	   of	   the	   proposition,	   the	   expressive	   context	   of	   propositions	   is	   that	   of	  
equivalence.	  None	  of	  them	  can	  mean	  more	  than	  any	  other:	  all	  propositions	  are	  equal	  in	  
value	  (see	  TLP,	  §	  6.4),	  no	  one	  reaches/expresses	  the	  value	  that	  good	  will	  and	  happy	  eye	  
can	  grasp.	   In	   the	  expressive	  order	  of	  propositions	  nothing	  can	   really	  happen:	   the	  new	  
sense	   that	  every	  proposition	  «can	  communicate»	   (TLP,	  §	  4.027)	  cannot	  come	  out	  as	  a	  
surprise.	   The	   impossibilty	   of	   there	   being	   surprise	   is	   a	   logical	   impossibility	   (see	   TLP,	   §	  	  
10	  See	  Wittgenstein	  (1979):	  86,	  and	  Wittgenstein	  (1984):	  181.	  
11	  Ibidem.	  
12	  Ivi:	  83.	  See	  also	  Wittgenstein	  (1984):	  178.	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6.1261).	  But	  the	  way	  the	  mystic	  feels,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  artistic	  point	  of	  view,	  and	  the	  ethical	  
and	   aesthetic	   attitude,	   concern	   precisely	   the	   «That»	   of	   the	   world,	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	  
surprise.	   This	   is	   the	   surprise	   of	   a	   «sense»	   that	   cannot	   be	   predicted,	   transcendentally	  
included	   within	   the	   logical	   order	   as	   Spiegelbild	   of	   the	   world,	   but	   must	   be	   implied,	  
transcendentally,	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  ethics	  and	  aesthetics.	  In	  the	  logical	  space	  of	  
possibilities,	   ethics	   and	   aesthetics	   cannot	   but	   involve	   the	   good	   life	   as	   a	   life	   of	  
knowledge,	  beauty	   that	  makes	  the	  eye	  happy,	  and	  the	  good	  work	  of	  art	  as	  «complete	  
expression».	  Their	  character,	  which	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  a	  language-­‐world	  divided	  
into	   elementary	   propositions	   remains	   unspoken,	   after	   all	   does	   not	   leave	   any	   room	   to	  
the	   rhetoric	   of	   ineffability,	   of	   hints,	   of	   allusive	   references,	   or	   to	   a	   psychologistic	  
reduction	   of	   the	   mystical	   feeling.	   This,	   then,	   brings	   to	   the	   question	   of	   how	   the	   ex-­‐
pressivism	  of	  non-­‐equivalence	   could	  arise	   from	   the	   transcendental	   space	  of	  possibility	  
into	  the	  linguistic-­‐mundane	  reality	  and	  thereby	  it	  brings	  to	  the	  question	  of	  judgment,	  of	  
a	  measure	  of	  the	  world,	  articulated	  and	  capable	  of	  understanding	  beauty,	  which	  makes	  
the	  eye	  happy,	  or	  good	  works	  of	  art,	  which	  are	  a	  case	  of	  «complete	  expression».	  Here,	  
an	   asymmetry	   between	   the	   ethically	   unexpressed	   and	   the	   aesthetically	   unexpressed	  
comes	  to	  the	  fore:	  feeling,	  in	  the	  latter,	  is	  internally	  linked	  with	  the	  realm	  of	  expression,	  
with	   an	   expressivism	   that	   cannot	  merely	   concern	   the	   first	   person	   or	   the	  work	   on	   the	  
self,	   provided	   that	   ethical	   expressivism	   (the	   love	   for	   one’s	   neighbor	   as	   inexistentia,	  
ontological	  implication,	  the	  love	  for	  the	  ethical	  intentio)	  can	  be	  logically	  circumscribed	  to	  
the	  space	  of	  the	  self.	  
This	   asymmetry	   of	   the	   aesthetic	   over	   the	   ethical	   is	   already	   evident,	   despite	  
appearances,	   in	   the	   1929	   Lecture	   on	   Ethics.	   The	  broad	   concept	   of	   ethics	  Wittgenstein	  
refers	  to	  in	  the	  Lecture	  indeed	  includes	  the	  «the	  most	  essential	  part	  of	  what	  is	  generally	  
called	   ‘aesthetics’»	   (Wittgenstein	   [2007]:	   223).	   The	   reason	   of	   this	   is	   that	   ethics	   and	  
aesthetics	  concern	  value	  («the	  enquiry	  into	  what	  is	  valuable»;	  ibidem)	  and	  the	  way	  it	  is	  
applied	   as	   criterion	   and	   measure	   in	   the	   propositional	   form	   of	   judgment.	   The	   entire	  
lecture	   presents	   then	   an	   apparently	   irreconcilable	   contrast	   between	   absolute	   and	  
relative	   judgment.	   The	   contrast	   derives	   from	   the	   difference	   between	   saying	   that	  
something	   is	   “good	   at”	   (relatively)	   and	   saying	   that	   something	   is	   absolutely	   “good”	   (a	  
problem	  Kant	  had	  faced	  in	  the	  First	  Moment	  of	  the	  Judgment	  of	  Taste).	  In	  the	  first	  case,	  
Wittgenstein	   explains,	   we	   have	   a	   kind	   of	   judgment	   that	   is	   convertible	   into	   a	   factual	  
statement	   and	   indeed	   no	   statement	   of	   facts	   can	   ever	   «be	   or	   imply,	   a	   judgment	   of	  
absolute	  value»	  (Wittgenstein	  [2007]:	  227).	  The	  latter,	  unlike	  «relative»	  value	  judgments	  
and	  «scientific	  propositions»	   (ibidem),	   can	  only	  be	  unverifiable	   (neither	   true	  nor	   false)	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and,	  therefore,	  it	  escapes	  both	  facts-­‐naturalism	  and	  meaning-­‐naturalism.	  Thus,	  «Ethics,	  
if	   it	   is	   anything,	   is	   supernatural	   and	   our	   words	   will	   only	   express	   facts»	   (Wittgenstein	  
[2007]:	  229).	  
Here	  we	  need	  to	  ask	  whether	  the	  super-­‐naturalism	  of	  ethics	  holds	  for	  aesthetics	  as	  
well.	  To	  a	  certain	  extent	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  but	  we	  also	  need	  to	  understand	  that	  in	  certain	  
respects	  the	  unity	  between	  ethics	  and	  aesthetics	  breaks	  up	  here.	  Plausibly,	  Wittgenstein	  
extends	  to	  aesthetics	  his	  remarks	  in	  the	  Lecture	  on	  Ethics	   in	  so	  far	  as	  the	  theme	  of	  the	  
miracle	   is	   concerned,	   i.e.	   the	   theme	   of	   the	   Sense	   of	   Wonder,	   of	   the	   wonder	   at	   the	  
existence	  of	  the	  world	  (where	  it	  resonates	  clearly	  the	  theme	  of	  mystical	  feeling	  and	  of	  
the	   artistic	   point	   of	   view	   explored	   in	   the	   Tractatus	   and	   in	   the	  Notebooks).	   Here,	   an	  
experience	  is	  necessarily	  involved.	  But	  to	  give	  absolute	  value	  to	  an	  experience	  would	  be,	  
for	  Wittgenstein,	   pure	   meaninglessness:	   when	   I	   describe	   a	   certain	   experience	   what	   I	  
mean	   by	   it	   is	   «just	   a	   fact	   like	   other	   facts»	   (Wittgenstein	   [2007]:	   239).This	   seems	   to	  
reproduce	  the	  duality	  of	  expression	  that	  we	  find	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Tractatus:	  on	  the	  one	  
hand,	   the	   sayability-­‐describabilty	   of	   the	   factual	   consistency	   of	   experience	   (ethical	   and	  
aesthetic	   experiences	   included);	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   unspeakable-­‐indescribable	  
character	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  experiences,	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  are	  tempted	  to	  attribute	  
to	   them	   absolute	   value	   and	   meaning.	   From	   this	   temptation	   it	   derives	   a	   tendency	  
towards	  running	  up	  against	  the	  limits	  of	  language:	  towards	  going	  «beyond	  the	  world	  and	  
that	   is	   to	   say	   beyond	   significant	   language»	   (ibidem).	   These	   are	   very	   well-­‐known	  
statements	  of	  Wittgenstein’s,	  and	  we	  should	  consider	  in	  how	  far	  they	  are	  still	  concerned	  
with	  the	  logico-­‐philosophical	  core	  of	  the	  Tractatus,	  from	  which	  Wittgenstein	  had	  begun	  
to	  distance	  himself	  (a	  process	  that	  never	  really	  reached	  an	  end).	  «I	  at	  once	  see	  clearly,	  
as	  it	  were	  in	  a	  flash	  of	  light»	  (ibidem)	  not	  only	  that	  no	  description	  would	  be	  adequate	  to	  
describe	  absolute	  value,	  but	  also	  that	  any	  description	  claiming	  to	  be	  meaningful	  should	  
be	  rejected	  ab	  initio.	  As	  it	  is	  well-­‐known,	  Wittgenstein	  identifies	  ethics	  with	  a	  tendency	  
towards	   breaking	   the	   iron	   cage	   of	   language	   (the	   desire	   to	   be	   able	   to	   say	   something	  
definitive	   about	   the	   meaning	   of	   life).	   Wittgenstein,	   however,	   can	   hardly	   identify	   this	  
same	   tendency	   with	   aesthetics.	   First	   of	   all,	   because	   the	   criteria	   applied	   in	   aesthetic	  
judgments	  escape	  the	  dichotomy	  between	  description	  and	  evaluation.	   In	  other	  words,	  
because	   the	   focus	  of	   aesthetics,	  what	  defines	   its	   conceptual	   field,	   cannot	  be	   absolute	  
value,	   value	   separated	   from	   the	   facts.	   Absolute	   aesthetic	   judgment,	   if	   it	   is	   not	   just	   a	  
conventionalistic	   disguise	   of	   ethical	   judgment,	   should	   concern	   the	   monoeidetic	  
character	   of	   platonic	   beauty,	  which	   is	   beautiful	   in	   and	  of	   itself	   (and	  not	   in	   relation	   to	  
something	   else).	   But	   for	   this	   very	   reason,	   because	   of	   the	   super-­‐nature	   of	   its	   object,	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absolute	   aesthetic	   judgment	   could	   not	   even	   be	   a	   judgment:	   if	   it	   were	   a	   judgment,	   it	  
would,	  so	  to	  speak,	  dazzle	  the	  nature	  of	  language	  with	  its	  own	  brightness13.	  It	  is	  this	  very	  
peculiar	  facet	  of	   language	  that	  should	  make	  us	  wonder,	  as	  Wittgenstein	  suggests	  (with	  
an	  apparently	  revoked	  statement,	  which	  is,	  however,	  barely	  revocable).	  The	  real	  wonder	  
(the	  miraculum	  to	  be	  admired)	  is	  thus	  the	  existence	  of	  language,	  its	  paradoxical	  factum.	  
On	   the	   one	   hand,	   this	   existence,	   as	   Wittgenstein’s	   subsequent	   work	   will	   clarify,	   is	  
concerned	  with	  the	  natural	  history	  of	  man14,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  however,	  it	  shows	  per	  
se,	  with	  its	  constitutively	  active	  and	  expressive	  character,	  the	  wondrous	  existence	  of	  the	  
world.	  To	  retrieve	  a	  passage	  from	  the	  Tagebücher,	  often	  quoted	  by	  Gargani	  in	  order	  to	  
argue	  for	  Wittgenstein’s	  expressivism:	  «So	  stellt	  der	  Satz	  den	  Sachverhalt	  gleichsam	  auf	  
eigene	  Faust	  dar»	  (TPU,	  5.11.1914)15;	   it	   is	   language	   itself,	   in	  the	   irreducible	  plurality	  of	  
the	  ways	  of	  his	  existence,	  that	  produces	  off	  its	  own	  bat	  («auf	  eigene	  Faust»)	  the	  «That»	  
of	  the	  world,	  but,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  add,	  it	  shows	  the	  «That»	  in	  its	  being	  together	  with	  the	  
«How»:	  the	  Daß	  together	  with	  the	  Wie.	  	  
With	   this	   way	   of	   looking,	   this	   seeing-­‐as	   pointing	   to	   language	   in	   a	   gesture	   of	  
astonished	  reflexivity	  (a	  form	  of	  reflected	  perception,	  inherent	  to	  its	  natural	  existence),	  
the	  boundaries	  of	  sense	  expand	  and	  contract	  from	  within	  language	  itself.	  The	  move	  that	  
rediscovers	  the	  friction	  of	  life,	  the	  rejection	  of	  any	  sliding	  away	  on	  the	  frozen	  ground	  of	  
logic,	  concerns	  the	  junction	  between	  rules	  of	  projection	  of	   linguistic	  symbols	  on	  reality	  
and	   logical	   form	   as	   the	   essence	   of	   the	   proposition.	   This	   is	   a	   topic	   that	   first	   briefly	  
appears	  in	  the	  Tractatus,	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  language	  of	  music:	  
In	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  a	  general	  rule	  by	  which	  the	  musician	  is	  able	  to	  read	  the	  symphony	  
out	  of	  the	  score,	  and	  that	  there	  is	  a	  rule	  by	  which	  one	  could	  reconstruct	  the	  symphony	  from	  
the	  line	  on	  a	  gramophone	  record	  and	  from	  this	  again—by	  means	  of	  the	  first	  rule—construct	  
the	  score,	  herein	  lies	  the	  internal	  similarity	  between	  these	  things	  which	  at	  first	  sight	  seem	  to	  
be	  entirely	  different.	  And	  the	  rule	  is	  the	  law	  of	  projection	  which	  projects	  the	  symphony	  into	  
the	   language	   of	   the	   musical	   score.	   It	   is	   the	   rule	   of	   translation	   of	   this	   language	   into	   the	  
language	  of	  the	  gramophone	  record.	  (TLP,	  §	  4.0141)	  
	  
13	  Just	   like	  –	  as	  Wittgenstein	  explicitly	  observes	  –	  «a	  book	  on	  Ethics	  which	  really	  was	  a	  book	  on	  
Ethics	   [...]	   would,	   with	   an	   explosion,	   destroy	   all	   the	   other	   books	   in	   the	   world»	   (Wittgenstein	  
[2007]:	  229).	  
14	  See,	  for	  instance	  §§	  25,	  415	  of	  the	  Investigations	  and	  with	  a	  greater	  margin	  of	  concern,	  in	  part	  
II,	  section	  xii.	  
15	  Wittgenstein	  (1984):	  115.	  This	  sentence	  –	  as	  Gargani	  himself	  often	  pointed	  out	  –	  is	  to	  be	  put	  in	  
close	   correlation	   with	   the	   remark	   from	   the	   1930-­‐32	   lectures	   that	   concerns	   the	   self-­‐contained	  
character	   of	   the	   symbol,	   i.e.	   the	   fact	   that	   «it	   does	   not	   point	   to	   something	   outside	   itself»	   (Lee	  
[1980]:	  43.	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What	  changes	  throughout	  the	  1930s	  is	  the	  meaning	  of	  «internal	  similarity»:	  «the	  law	  
of	  projection»	  	  and	  «rule	  of	  translation»	  act	  towards	  reality	  both	  bildend	  and	  abbildend,	  
both	  as	  figuration	  and	  as	  representation,	  in	  a	  double	  movement	  that	  forms	  the	  unity	  of	  
expression	  qua	  unity	  of	  form	  and	  content,	  external	  and	  internal.	  The	  passage	  from	  the	  
score	   to	   the	   symphony	   or	   the	   passage	   from	   the	   line	   on	   a	   gramophone	   record	   to	   the	  
sound	   waves	   and	   from	   the	   sound	   waves	   to	   musical	   thought	   (which	   Wittgenstein	  
mentions	   in	   the	   above	   observation)	   cannot	   be	   thought	   of	   anymore	   as	   a	   system	   of	  
equivalences	   sharing	   the	   same	   logical	   form.	   In	   this	   respect	   it	   is	   crucial	   an	  observation	  
from	   Philosophische	   Grammatik,	   where	   Wittgenstein	   recognizes	   as	   a	   failure	   of	   the	  
Tractatus	   his	   having	   considered	   there	   the	   relationship	  between	   thought	   and	   reality	   in	  
terms	  of	   an	   «Übereinstimmung	  der	   form»16	  and	   as	   an	   alternative	   suggests	   to	   think	   of	  
this	   relationship	   in	   terms	   of	   «Bildhaftigkeit».	   The	   word	   Bildhaftigkeit,	   translated	   as	  
«pictorial	  character»	  (Wittgenstein	  [1974]:	  212),	  should	  be	  understood	  in	  two	  ways,	  and	  
the	   same	   is	   true	   of	   the	  word	   «Bild»,	  which	   is	   like	   both	   a	   plastic	  model/figure17	  and	   a	  
figurative	  portrait.	  Thus,	  «an	  order	  is	  the	  picture	  of	  the	  action	  which	  was	  carried	  out	  on	  
the	   order;	   but	   also	   a	   picture	   of	   the	   action	   which	   is	   to	   be	   carried	   out	   as	   an	   order»	  
(Wittgenstein	  [1974]:	  212).	  What	  has	  changed	  radically,	  perhaps,	  is	  the	  very	  «method	  of	  
projection»,	   an	   ‘ethereal’	   and	   ‘radiant’	   bridge,	   so	   to	   speak,	   which	   is	   built	   in	   the	   very	  
moment	   when	   it	   is	   employed.	   Here	   the	   passage	   is	   not	   pre-­‐determined	   as	   to	   its	  
possibility;	   rather	   it	   is,	   from	   time	   to	   time	   (any	   time	   it	   is	   employed)	   simultaneously	  
determined	  and	  undetermined;	   it	   is	   a	  passage	  governed	  by	  a	  mechanism	  with	   several	  
degrees	   of	   freedom,	   i.e.	   the	   grammatical	   mechanism	   which	   makes	   it	   possible	   to	   use	  
perceptible	  signs	  symbolically	  (and	  to	  translate	  different	  units	  of	  meaning),	  an	  extremely	  
formative	  and	  internally	  depictive	  use.	  	  
On	   the	   analogy	   between	  Mechanismus	   and	   grammar	   Wittgenstein	   wrote	   several	  
remarks	   around	   1930,	   distancing	   himself	   from	   the	   image	   of	   language	   as	   calculus	   and	  
arguing	   that	   the	   «meaning	   of	   a	  word	   [is]	   shown	   in	   time	   […]	   like	   the	   actual	   degree	   of	  
freedom	   in	   a	   mechanism»	   (Wittgenstein	   [2005]:	   115e).	   The	   meaning	   of	   these	  
observations,	  which	  are	  included	  in	  Philosophischen	  Betrachtungen	  and	  reappear	  in	  the	  
Big	   Typescript	   and	   the	   Philosophical	   Bemerkungen,	   may	   be	   summarized	   by	   this	  
	  
16	  Wittgenstein	   (1984a):	   212;	   see	   also	   p.	   163,	   where	   it	   is	   suggested	   to	   replace	   the	   notion	   of	  
agreement	  between	  thought	  and	  reality	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  Bildhaftigkeit.	  On	  this	  passage	  see	  
Hrachovec	  (2011):	  23-­‐34.	  
17	  Figure	  has	  here	  the	  meaning	  we	  find	  in	  Varrone	  (De	  lingua	  latina,	  6,	  78):	  «fictor	  cum	  dicit	  fingo	  
figuram	  imponit».	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proposition:	  «Grammar	  gives	  language	  the	  necessary	  degrees	  of	  freedom»18.	  
The	   phrase	   unfolds	   its	   meaning	   without	   any	   need	   for	   it	   to	   be	   understood	  
metaphorically.	  Even	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  grammar,	   language	   is	  no	   longer	  a	  steel	  
cage,	  «A	  proposition	  gives	   reality	  a	  degree	  of	   freedom;	   it	  draws	  a	   line	   round	  the	   facts	  
which	  agree	  with	  it,	  and	  distinguishes	  them	  from	  those	  which	  do	  not»	  (Lee	  [1980]:	  56,	  
lecture	   B	   XIII).	   That	   of	   the	   Mechanismus	   is	   a	   paradoxical	   image	   (and	   Wittgenstein	  
stresses	   its	   image-­‐character)19,	   which,	   like	   that	   of	   the	   ethereal	   bridge,	   presents	   the	  
features	  of	  an	  active	  mimesis	  –	  a	  «Bild»	  	  (in	  both	  the	  senses	  indicated)	  –	  of	  the	  living,	  of	  
life	  in	  its	  unpredictability.	  So	  while	  «Grammar	  is	  the	  life	  of	  the	  propositional	  sign»20,the	  
proposition	   will	   then	   engage	   with	   the	   world	   of	   life,	   building	   and	   portraying	   it.	   The	  
degree	  of	  freedom	  of	  the	  mechanism	  concerns	  both	  the	  meshing	  of	  its	  parts	  and	  what	  it	  
is	   applied	   to	   (that	  upon	  which	   it	   exercises	   its	   effect).	   In	   a	  double	  movement	  between	  
determinacy	   and	   indeterminacy	   (that	   can	   be	   experienced,	   for	   instance,	   in	   the	  
Unbestimmtheit	  of	  all	  the	  representations	  that	  the	  word	  «red»	  awakens	  in	  us21	  or	  in	  the	  
«something	  constantly	   fluctuating»	   (Wittgenstein	   [1974]:	  77	   (III,	  36))	  we	  discern	  when	  
considering	  the	  use	  of	  a	  word),	  between	  mechanism	  and	  degree	  of	   freedom,	  between	  
rule	  and	  surprise,	  the	  proto-­‐form	  of	  the	  mutual	  meshing	  of	  language	  game	  and	  aesthetic	  
attitude	  is	  arranged.	  The	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  of	  the	  grammatical	  Mechanismus	  (a	  word	  
where	   some	   of	   the	   accents	   of	   Hölderlin’s	   mechané	   resonate)	   as	   active	   mimesis	  
(bildhaftig:	   the	   image	   that	   gives	   form)	   of	   the	  world	   of	   life	   are	   the	   seeds	   or	   even	   the	  
Urzelle	  from	  which,	  as	  Goethe	  would	  have	  had	  it,	  Wittgenstein’s	  «symbolische	  Pflanze»	  	  
of	  language	  springs	  out22.	  	  
In	   the	   1938	   Lectures	   on	   Aesthetics,	   this	   scenario	   presents	   sharper	   edges:	   the	  
intertwining	  and	  even	  the	  common	  genesis	  of	  language	  games	  and	  aesthetic	  reactions23	  	  
18	  Wittgenstein	   (1975):	   74.	   The	   remark	   is	   included	   in	   Philosophische	   Betrachtungen	   (Nachlass,	  
Item	  107,	  p.	  282)	  in	  a	  sheet	  from	  3.3.30.	  
19	  «The	  picture	  of	  a	  mechanism	  can	   indeed	  be	  a	  sign	  of	  a	  degree	  of	   freedom.	  That	   is,	   it	  can	  be	  
used	  to	  show	  what	  movements	  something	   is	  supposed	  to	  perform	  (in	  my	  opinion	  will	  perform,	  
has	  performed,	  etc.)»	  (L.	  Wittgenstein	  [2005]:116e).	  Wittgenstein	  asks	  «What	  turns	  a	  picture	  into	  
a	  sign	  for	  a	  degree	  of	  freedom?».	  Certainly	  it	  is	  not	  something	  outside	  itself.	  Maybe	  we	  can	  point	  
to	  a	  mechanism	  and	  make	  it	  move	  in	  a	  certain	  way.	  But	  the	  movements	  would	  only	  be	  «a	  sign	  we	  
used	  to	  explain	  a	  different	  sign»	  (Ibidem).	  
20	  Wittgenstein,	  Nachlass,	  Item	  109,	  Bd.	  V,	  	  Bemerkungen,	  p.	  40	  (23.8.30)	  [«Die	  Grammatik	  ist	  das	  
Lebens	  des	  Satzzeichens»].	  
21	  See	  ibidem.	  
22	  For	  a	  comparison	  between	  Wittgenstein’s	  and	  Goethe’s	  morphologies	  see	  J.	  Schulte	  (1990):	  11-­‐
42.	  
23	  On	  the	  relevance	  of	   the	  notion	  of	  «aesthetic	   reaction»	   in	  Wittgenstein	  see	  S.	  Säätelä	   (2002):	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here	  seems	  to	  assume	  an	  almost	  paradigmatic	  value,	  not	  only	  because	  among	  the	  first	  
words	   learned	   by	   children	   there	   are	   some	   of	   general	   aesthetic	   valence	   (such	   as	   the	  
interchangeable	   «good»	   	   and	   «beautiful»),	   but	   also,	   and	   above	   all,	   because	   of	   the	  
aesthetic	   character	  of	   the	  very	  mode	  of	   learning	   (from	  the	  melodic	  modulation	  of	   the	  
voice	  to	  the	  rhythmical-­‐gestural	  density	  that	  is	  characteristic	  of	  the	  action).	  The	  abstract	  
analysis	  of	  the	  propositional	  form	  of	  aesthetic	  judgments	  and	  of	  the	  related	  application	  
of	  categories	  is	  here	  replaced	  by	  the	  description	  of	  use	  in	  its	  morphogenetic	  dynamics:	  
(If	   I	  had	  to	  say	  what	   is	   the	  main	  mistake	  made	  by	  philosophers	  of	   the	  present	  generation,	  
including	  Moore,	  I	  would	  say	  that	  it	  is	  that	  when	  language	  is	  looked	  at,	  what	  is	  looked	  at	  is	  a	  
form	  of	  words	  and	  not	  the	  use	  made	  of	  the	  form	  of	  words.)	  (Wittgenstein	  [1967]:	  2)	  
Instead	  of	   focusing	  on	  words	   like	  «good»	   	  and	  «beautiful»,	  equivalent	   to	  any	  other	  
word	  as	  for	  their	  form,	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  aesthetic	  judgment	  is	  equivalent	  in	  form	  to	  
any	  other	  kind	  of	   judgment	  (perceptual,	  cognitive,	  ethical,	  etc.),	  Wittgenstein	  wants	  us	  
to	  focus	  our	  attention	  on	  the	  occasions	  when	  words	  are	  uttered,	  on	  the	  occasions	  when	  
expression	  is	  important.	  With	  this	  attention	  to	  the	  internal	  constraint	  that	  is	  established	  
between	   occasion	   (context)	   and	   expression	  we	   can	   capture	   the	   aesthetic	   import	   that	  
characterizes	   the	   expressivism	  of	   language	   games,	   and	   not	   only	   of	   primitive	   language	  
games;	   we	   can	   capture	   the	   degree	   of	   freedom	   that	   ensures	   the	   double	   movement	  
between	  determinacy	  and	  indeterminacy.	  	  
If	   you	   came	   to	   a	   foreign	   tribe,	  whose	   language	   you	  didn’t	   know	  at	   all,	   and	   you	  wished	   to	  
know	   what	   words	   corresponded	   to	   «good»,	   «fine»,	   etc.,	   what	   would	   you	   look	   for?	   You	  
would	  look	  for	  smiles,	  gestures,	  food,	  toys.	  (Wittgenstein	  [1967]:	  2)	  
With	   this	   remark	   Wittgenstein	   takes	   a	   decisive	   step	   not	   only	   for	   re-­‐thinking	  
aesthetics	   but	   also	   for	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   link	   between	   the	   genesis	   of	   the	   aesthetic	  
attitude	  and	  language	  learning.	  Inevitably,	  this	  leads	  far	  away	  from	  “normal”	  aesthetics,	  
and	   also	   from	   the	   Tractarian	   claim	   concerning	   the	   unity	   of	   ethics	   and	   aesthetics.	  
However,	  such	  unity	   is	  not	  altogether	  rejected:	   the	   logical	  unity	  of	  unspoken	  feeling	   is	  
here	   replaced	   by	   the	   affinity,	   the	  Verwandtschaft,	   between	   different	   language	   games	  
and	  different	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  world.	  An	  affinity	  which	  presupposes	  and	  maintains	  
the	   difference	   between	   the	   aesthetic	   and	   the	   ethical,	   with	   the	   awareness	   of	   the	  
dynamics	   of	   their	   relationship,	   of	   their	   being	   inter-­‐related.	   As	   for	   the	   aesthetic	   (and,	  
perhaps,	  in	  general),	  the	  first	  step	  is	  then	  that	  between	  interjections	  and	  adjectives	  such	  
as	  «beautiful»,	  «pretty»,	  etc.	  The	  transition	  here	  is	  not	  irreversible.	  It	  is	  analogous	  to	  the	  	  
49-­‐72.	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fact	  that	  words	  such	  as	  «pompous»	  	  and	  «stately»	  	  could	  be	  «expressed	  by	  faces»	  and	  
gestures,	  and	  the	  melancholy	  character	  of	  a	  piece	  by	  Schubert	  (such	  as	  the	  Sonata	  in	  A	  
minor	   Arpeggione)	   may	   be	   expressed	   exactly	   with	   a	   dance	   (Wittgenstein	   [1967]:	   4).	  
What	   is	   crucial	   here,	   however,	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   we	   are	   learning	   a	   grammar.	   Even	   the	  
interjection	  and	  the	  gesture	  belong	  to	  or	  enter	  into	  a	  language	  game,	  the	  expression	  of	  
an	  entire	  culture.	  The	   interest	  and	  the	  peculiar	  way	   in	  which	  we	  learn	  the	  grammar	  of	  
the	  aesthetic,	  for	  example	  in	  those	  acts	  of	  shared	  attention	  that	  precede	  the	  learning	  of	  
a	  language24,	  lie	  certainly	  in	  the	  primitive	  character	  of	  its	  mechanism,	  whose	  degrees	  of	  
freedom	  are	  revealed	  with	  the	  passing	  of	  time,	  while	  we	  learn	  new	  rules.	  The	  primitive	  
character	   of	   the	   mechanism	   certainly	   does	   not	   make	   it	   a	   super-­‐mechanism,	   as	  
Wittgenstein	   does	   not	   fail	   to	   observe	   (Wittgenstein	   [1967]:	   15).	   Speaking	   of	   a	   super-­‐
mechanism	  would	  mean	   still	   be	   thinking	   of	   a	   crypto-­‐form	   of	   logical	   necessity	   or	   of	   a	  
super-­‐form	  of	  language	  game,	  capable	  of	  holding	  all	   language	  games	  together.	  What	  is	  
important	   is,	   rather,	   the	   «sense»	   	   or	   the	   aesthetic	   import	   of	   the	  primitive	   connection	  
between	   form	  of	   life	  and	   language	  games25.	   It	   is	  as	   if	  with	   this	  move	  one	  could	  cast	  a	  
look-­‐through,	   capable	   of	   grasping	   the	   internal	   condition	   of	   possibility	   of	   such	   a	  
connection.	   This	  means	   that,	   in	  order	   to	  begin,	   a	   language	  game	   requires	  nothing	  but	  
itself,	  implying	  then	  –	  à	  la	  Schiller	  –	  the	  game	  itself	  as	  natural	  “impulse”.	  This	  is	  a	  way	  of	  
looking	   that	   gives	   a	   new	   meaning	   to	   the	   transcendental	   character	   of	   the	   aesthetic,	  
without	   thereby	   conferring	   it	   absolute	   primacy	   or	   even	   the	   value	   of	   a	   kind	   of	  
foundation.	  What	  is	  gained	  here	  is	  rather	  a	  model	  of	  explanation	  of	  the	  morphogenesis	  
of	   language	  games,	  of	   their	  being	   related	  and	   intertwined	  as	   if	   they	   formed	  a	  system.	  
Thanks	   to	   this	  way	   of	   looking,	   the	   very	   notion	   of	   form	   of	   life	   loses	   a	   certain	   residual	  
dogmatism,	   or	   myth	   of	   the	   given,	   in	   which	   sometimes	   Wittgenstein’s	   interpreters	  
indulge.	  In	  the	  connection	  between	  expressivism,	  aesthetic	  import	  and	  language	  game,	  
even	  the	  form	  of	  life,	  in	  the	  primal	  features	  of	  childhood,	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  space	  that	  
can	  be	  analysed	  and	  observed	  (and	  not	  just	  the	  form	  of	  a	  rock	  against	  which	  the	  spade	  
of	  reason	  bends).	  Once	  freed	  from	  the	  obsession	  of	  foundation,	  we	  can	  then	  grasp	  the	  
paradigm	  of	  rules	  formation	  and	  aesthetic	  criteria,	  in	  the	  crystallization	  of	  «wishes»,	  for	  
instance.	   The	   word	   «wishes»,	   	   says	  Wittgenstein,	   «is	   much	   too	   vague»	   (Wittgenstein	  
(1967):	  6).	  Yet	   it	  also	  indicates	  something	  determinate:	  one	  of	  the	  possible	  sources,	  by	  	  
24	  On	  this	  see	  Tomasello	  (2009).	  Tomasello,	  in	  his	  researches	  on	  language	  learning	  in	  contexts	  of	  
shared	   attention	   between	   child	   and	   adult,	   constantly	   refers	   to	   the	   new	   direction	   of	   research	  
opened	  by	  Wittgenstein).	  On	  the	  question	  of	  the	  genesis	  of	  the	  aesthetic	  attitude	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
attentional	  processes	  see	  also	  Desideri	  (2011):	  43-­‐60	  especially.	  
25	  «But	  what	  is	  a	  connection?	  Well,	  levers,	  chains,	  cogwheels.	  [...]»	  (Wittgenstein	  (1967):	  15).	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virtue	  of	   the	   indeterminacy	  of	  will,	  of	   the	  development	  of	  an	  aesthetic	  attitude	   in	   the	  
human	   landscape.	   Vague,	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	   binding,	   is	   the	   complex	   of	   attitudes,	  
responses	   (reactions)	   and	   experiences	   the	   plural	   term	   «wishes»	   is	   linked	   with:	  
expectation,	  anticipation,	  discomfort,	  disappointment,	  delusion,	  pleasure	   in	   its	   various	  
forms,	   dissatisfaction.	   From	   this	   fertile	   soil	   spring,	   in	   the	   form	   of	   crystallizations,	  
preferences,	  quasi-­‐rules	  of	  taste	  and	  aesthetic	  criteria,	  and	  a	  grammar	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  
pain	   is	   arranged.	   For	   the	   terms	   expressing	   our	   experiences	   and	   aesthetic	   evaluations	  
holds,	   in	   fact,	   what	   Wittgenstein,	   in	   the	   Philosophical	   Investigations,	   observes	   with	  
regard	   to	   learning	   through	   language	   the	   concept	   “pain”.	   As	   well	   as	   the	   verbal	  
expression	   of	   pain	   does	   not	   mean	   crying,	   while	   it	   replaces	   it	   (TPU,	   §	   244),	   also	   the	  
aesthetic	   judgment	   does	   not	   mean	   or	   describe	   the	   interjection	   of	   wonder	   and	  
admiration.	   It	   replaces	   it,	   instead,	   and,	   in	   this	   way,	   through	   the	   grammar	   of	   the	  
aesthetic	  a	  world	   is	  born.	  Plato	  had	  already	  understood	   this	  when,	   in	   the	  Cratylus,	  he	  
brought	  back	  the	  meaning	  of	  to	  kalòn	  to	  the	  act	  of	  naming,	  and	  to	  the	  pleasure	  we	  feel	  
when	   we	   call	   things	   kalà.	   Qua	   unity	   of	   calling	   and	   of	   the	   thing	   being	   called	   (of	   its	  
intrinsic	   value	   and	   of	   the	   pleasure	   it	   arouses),	   to	   kalòn	   is	   the	   word	   that	   testifies	   the	  
expressivism	   of	   language	   as	   indeterminate	   and	   binding	   connection	   between	  
grammatical	   mechanism	   and	   degrees	   of	   freedom,	   between	   inner	   and	   outer26,	   once	  
these	   terms	   have	   been	   freed	   from	   any	   sort	   of	   mythological	   charm	   or	   hypostatic	  
determination.	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